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Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the corporate governance literature in emerging economies by 
examining the effect of some corporate governance mechanisms on financing decisions in Saudi Arabian listed 
companies. A multiple regression model is used to examine the association between financing decisions and 
corporate governance mechanisms for a sample of 37 listed Saudi companies. In particular, we examine the effect 
of board size, ownership concentration and corporate governance reporting on the debt-to-equity ratio. Corporate 
governance reporting is measured by the content analysis approach. After controlling for companies’ profitability 
and their growth opportunities, we found that both board size and ownership concentration are positively 
associated with debt-to-equity ratio. We limit our analysis to a small sample of firms that use the internet to 
communicate corporate governance information between October 2005 and January 2006. The findings suggest 
that managers are likely to choose higher financial leverage when they have stronger corporate governance (large 
number of directors on the board and higher ownership concentration). However, we did not find any statistical 
association between corporate governance disclosure and debt-to-equity ratio. This suggests that firm’s 
asymmetric information is not an important driver of the financing decision of Saudi Arabian companies. This 
might be due to the nature of the Saudi business environment. We strongly believe that this paper provides a novel 
contribution to the existing literature as we are the first to examine this issue in Saudi Arabia. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the effect of corporate 
governance characteristics on financing decisions in Saudi Arabian listed companies. In particular, it examines the 
effect of board size, ownership concentration and corporate governance reporting on the debt-to-equity ratio. The 
investigation of these research issues in Saudi business environment could extend prior research and give different 
explanations to those carried out in more developed countries. 
Research related to determinant of corporate capital structure is a well established part of the accounting and 
finance research. Modigliani & Miller (1958) is the first to study this area of research. They also provided another 
study in the same area of research after modifying some assumptions such as relaxing the prefect market 
assumptions and considering corporate tax into their models (Miller & Modigliani, 1963). In their later study, they 
suggested that firm value will be enhanced if the level of debt increases because interest rate is a tax deductible and 
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consequently companies would enjoy debt tax shield when funding their activities by long-term debt. 
Further accounting and finance research studies were more expressive. Those researches were concentrated 
on examining some determinants of corporate capital structure. For example, the association between board size 
and capital structure decisions have been suggested by a number of empirical studies (for example, Mehran, 1992; 
Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Wen, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek, 2002; Du & Dai, 2005; 
Abor & Biekpe, 2005; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2010a, 2010b). Another determinant of capital structure decision 
which received significant attention is the ownership concentration (for example, Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2010a, 2010b). More recently, number of studies have, also, investigated the association 
between asymmetric information and corporate decisions (for example, Li & Zhao, 2008; Bharath, Pasquariello & 
WU, 2009). 
The results of these research studies suggest that firm value will be enhanced if the level of debt increases, 
board size and ownership concentration are associated with capital structure decisions and firms with higher levels 
of information asymmetric are more likely to use debt in financing their activities than equity. 
Unfortunately, the results of these research studies cannot be generalized for number of reasons. First, these 
results provided mixed evidence. For example, Mehran (1992), Berger, et al. (1997), and Abor & Biekpe (2005) 
found a significant negative association between the size of the board of directors and debt-to-equity ratios, while 
Jensen (1986) found a positive association between higher debt ratios and larger board size. Further, other 
researchers found that there is no significant association between board size and debt-to-equity ratios (i.e., 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Wen, et al., 2002; Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2010a, 2010b). 
A second reason for the difficulty behind generalizing the results of these research studies is that the majority 
of them were carried out in most developed countries such as U.S. and European continental. More precisely, in 
developing countries the conclusions of this line of research are likely to be challenged due to the business 
environmental differences between those of developed and those of developing countries. In another words, in a 
different business environment such those of the Middle Eastern countries, there are significant environmental 
factors that may affect corporate capital structure decisions. Hove (1986 & 1990) asserted the importance of 
political, economical, and social systems on corporate decisions. 
Third reason for the difficulty of generalizing the evidence of prior research examining determinants of corporate 
capital structure is that there are very limited numbers of studies that have examined determinants of capital structure 
in developing countries and even fewer such studies may be found in the Middle East countries, leaving significant 
doubt about the applicability of these evidence in the business environment of Middle East countries 
Accordingly, a natural area of extending the lines of the accounting and finance research related to 
determinant of corporate capital structure decisions is to explore other drivers of corporate capital structure 
decisions and to consider suggested drivers within a different business environment. 
In the present paper, we aim to examine the degree to which corporate governance affect the financing 
decisions of Saudi Arabian listed companies. We focus only on three corporate governance mechanisms. These are 
board size, ownership concentration and corporate governance reporting. The main reasons for concentrating on 
these issues are the possibility of making comparison with other studies because these are the most studied issues 
in the literature, the availability of data regarding these issues1, and the importance of advising regulators whom 
are more concern about these issues in the process of regulating corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
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To help us in focusing on a group of firms that report corporate governance information on their websites, we 
utilised a sample of 37 companies listed in Saudi Stock Market in January 2006. This was based on a recent paper 
by Hussainey & AlNodel (2008) who collected their sample from Saudi listed companies’ websites between 
October 2005 and January 2006 representing a total number of 77 companies listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange 
at that time. 
We found that both board size and ownership concentration are positively associated with the debt-to-equity 
ratio. However, we did not find a significant association between corporate governance reporting and the 
debt-to-equity ratio. The findings seem to suggest that managers are likely to choose higher financial leverage 
when they have stronger corporate governance (large number of directors on the board and higher ownership 
concentration). However, firm’s asymmetric information seems to be not a driver of the financing decision of 
Saudi Arabian companies. 
A possible explanation is that decisions related to capital structure are affected by the Islamic view of 
financing which prohibits interests and in turn to the public view who disrespects such practice. This is enhanced 
by the weakness of the business reporting practice in Saudi Arabia which could provide pave for a different mean 
of getting information by parties related to loan agreements. 
The results of this paper may be of use to the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority (SACMA, thereafter) 
who issued a guidance in 2006 that recommends all listed companies to disclose corporate governance 
information to the public. This would help SACMA to explore the attitude of companies to voluntarily report 
corporate governance rather than being enforced to do so. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on the determinants of corporate capital 
structure. In Section 3, a description of the Saudi business environment is provided. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the 
development of the research hypotheses and the research model. Section 6 is the data description. The main 
regression results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes and suggests areas for future research. 
2. Literature review 
Although the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure has been the subject for an 
extensive research in developed countries2, a limited research has been carried out to investigate the issue in 
business environment of developing countries. 
The association between board size and capital structure decisions has been well established in prior 
accounting and finance research. In particular, Mehran (1992), Berger, et al. (1997), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Wen, et al. (2002), Du and Dai (2005), Abor & Biekpe (2005) and Al-Najjar & Hussainey (2010a, 2010b) 
examined the association between board size and corporate capital structure decision, but the results are mixed. 
Mehran (1992), Berger, et al. (1997) and Abor & Biekpe (2005) reported a significant negative association 
between the size of the board of directors and debt-to-equity ratios. However, Jensen (1986) revealed a positive 
association between higher debt ratios and larger board size. Other researchers found that there is no significant 
association between board size and debt-to-equity ratios (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Wen, et al., 2002; Al-Najjar & 
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Hussainey, 2010a, 2010b). 
Ownership concentration is considered as one of the key determinants of capital structure decision. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) reported that managerial shareholdings have consistent positive influence on 
family-owned firm leverage. In addition, Al-Najjar & Hussainey (2010a) found that insider ownership is 
positively and significantly associated with the debt-to-equity ratio. However, Al-Najjar & Hussainey (2010b) did 
not find the expected significant results. 
A relatively recent and growing number of studies have investigated the association between asymmetric 
information and corporate decisions (see Li & Zhao, 2008 for more details). For example, Bharath, et al. (2009) 
used a novel information asymmetry index and examined the extent to which information asymmetry is a 
determinant of capital structure decisions. They found that information asymmetry affects capital structure 
decisions of US companies. In particular, they found a significant positive association between information 
asymmetry and debt-to-equity ratio. In other words, their results suggest that firms with higher levels of 
information asymmetric are more likely to use debt in financing their activities than equity. 
On the other hand, other research found that voluntary disclosure is negatively related to asymmetric 
information. For example, Hussainey, Schleicher & Walker (2003) found higher levels of voluntary disclosure 
reduce information asymmetry between the firm and investors and hence increase investors’ ability to better 
anticipate future earnings. 
Research investigating corporate governance in developing countries is much beyond in considering the 
impact of issues of corporate governance on corporation capital structure. A review of research investigating 
issues of corporate governance revealed that most such research approach the issue whether to describe the state 
of corporate governance from an official perspective or from the perspective of what should the practical 
applications of its principles be. 
For example, Al-Motairy (2003) explored the state of corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia. He 
concluded that there is a vital need for: (1) a review of these regulations to reflect the current practices of corporate 
governance, (2) the issuance of guidance for best practices for management and financial affair in corporations and 
(3) the establishment of an organization to accelerate the adoption of best practices of corporate governance. 
Similarly, Fouzy (2003) evaluated the practices of corporate governance’s principles in Egypt. He recognized 
the development in Egyptian official regulations toward the application of best practices of corporate governance. 
He then argued that these developments are not met enough by Egyptian companies in their practical applications. 
Another example is the study which was carried out by Oyelere & Mohammed (2005) investigating the practices 
of corporate governance in Oman and how it is being communicated to stakeholders. They recommend enhanced 
regulation and communication for the Omani stock market to keep pace with the international developments. 
Finally, a research paper by the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE, 2003) examined the 
corporate governance practice in four Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon). It was 
found that corporate governance practice is approached differently by each country depending on the 
sophistication of the financial market in each country. The research paper further provided several 
recommendations to improve the application of the principles of corporate governance in the region as a whole. 
The impact of the corporation attitude toward their corporate governance on their financing decisions needs 
further investigation giving the unique of the Saudi business environment and the mixed results of the accounting 
and finance research relating to the determinants of corporate capital structure. This is evident by the unique 
aspects of the business environment of Saudi Arabia which will be discussed in the following paragraph. 
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3. Saudi business environment 
This section provides a general description of the environment of the Saudi business practices. The 
discussion will be directed to the most important environmental factors, as suggested by the literature. The main 
aspects of the Saudi business practices that will be discussed are the social, economical, and political systems. 
Also, some highlights will be given to the 1965 Company Law that regulates the practice of Saudi businesses and 
the guidance of corporate governance issued by SACMA in 2006 which regulates corporate governance reporting. 
As a conservative society, a significant number of Saudis are adherent to Islamic values such as avoiding 
loan interests. This does not mean there is no such type of transactions but to mean that the majority of Saudis do 
not openly accept such transactions. Saudi society is also characterized by the impact of the personality and power 
of particular individuals, the role of family and friend relationships over regulations, privilege given to personal 
relationships over tasks, and the existence of a high level of secrecy (Al-Rumaihi, 1997; AlNodel, 2004). 
The economy of Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy and government exercises strong controls over major 
economic activities. Since the discovery of oil in 1938, oil revenue represents the biggest contribution to the 
economy. In 1990s, it accounted for around 35% of nominal GDP, about 75% of government revenues, and 85% 
of export receipts (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Table 1 presents the country’s budgetary revenues, 
expenditures and net surplus or (deficit) for the last three years. 
 
Table 1  Saudi Arabia budgetary revenues, expenditures and net surplus or deficit (2005-2007) 
Annual government budgeting ( estimates) Million Saudi Riyals ($1= 3.75 SR) 
Total revenues Oil revenues Non-oil revenues Total expenditures (Deficit)/Surplus Year 
Amount Amount % Amount % Amount Amount 
2005 280,000 220,000 79 60,000 21 280,000 0 
2006 390,000 320,000 82 70,000 18 335,000 55,000 
2007 400,000 330,000 83 70,000 17 380,000 20,000 
Source: SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) annual report (2007). 
 
Similar to most developing countries, Saudi businesses are characterized by the domination of family 
businesses, the deep involvement of the government in the private sector, and the existence of a number of 
foreign-owned and controlled companies based on joint venture agreements with domestic companies. Al-Nodel 
(2004) reported that joint-stock companies represent only 1.14% of the total number, and account for less than 
40% of the total capital of the registered businesses. 
Since the type of businesses is mostly small to medium size companies, there was an apparent need for more 
foreign investors and involvement of the government in the private sector to carry some important activities which 
cannot be carried out or provided by local companies. This has left the country with significant number of 
foreign-owned and controlled companies based on joint venture agreements with domestic companies and 
significant involvement of government in some major business activities (Presley, 1984; Aba-Alkhail, 2001). 
The political system of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, headed by the King. Within the political system, there are 
three legislative bodies, which have the authority to initiate and/or approve policies, regulation or rules: the Council 
of Ministers, the Consultative Council, and various individual Ministries (Al-Amari, 1989; Al-Rumaihi, 1997). 
The legal system of Saudi Arabia is derived from Islamic law (Shariah; Alqur’an Alkareem & Sunna 
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Alsharifah3) and coded laws for a number of specific fields, such as commerce, tax and labour. Al-Amari (1989) 
reported that Islamic law prevails in legal disputes. 
Two of the most important aspects of the Islamic values relating to corporate financing are that Islamic law 
prohibits loan interests whether giving or taking by individuals or business institutions and obligation of Zaket4 
which should be giving, calculated based on the capital of the business or individual, and given to specific groups 
as mentioned by Alqur’an Alkareem & Sunna Alsharifah. Taxes duty is imposed on non-Saudi or Gulf States 
companies operate in Saudi Arabia. 
There are some differences between Zaket and Taxes whether on whom to impose, the manner of collection, 
or calculation. For example, Zaket is based on the wealth of the business with some specific deductions for 
specific items as indicated by Shariah; Alqur’an Alkareem & Sunna Alsharifah, while tax is based on the net 
income with some deduction according to the law of taxes. 
The 1965 Company Law regulates the practice of businesses in Saudi Arabia. It sets conditions for several 
aspects of businesses such as legal frameworks through which business companies can be established, the 
registration requirements, minimum capital to be maintained, number of partners, number of directors, accounts, 
the annual audit of the accounts, and so on. Shinawi & Crum (1971) asserted that the origin of the 1965 Saudi 
Company Law goes back to the British Companies Act of 1948. The similarity between the 1965 Saudi Company 
Law and the UK acts issued in 1948, 1967 and 1976 was also reported by Kahlid (1983). 
The reporting requirements which are imposed by the 1965 Company Law represent the only rules that 
should be observed. It requires the issuance of a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, and a report on the 
company’s operations and financial position every fiscal year. It further stipulates that all corporations and limited 
liability companies must issue annual financial statements audited by an independent auditor licensed to practice 
by the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Similar to stock markets in developing countries, the Saudi stock market is new and small. In 1984, the 
Royal Decree No. 81230 was issued as an attempt to officially regulate the stock exchange (Abdeen & Dale, 1984; 
El-Sharkawy, 2006). Under this Royal Decree, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was given actual 
control over the stock exchange through national commercial banks. 
The significant change was in 2003 when the Saudi Arabian Capital Market Authority (SACMA) was 
established to oversight the exchange of Saudi stocks (Ramady, 2005). This period observed significant increase 
of the number of listed companies, regulations for the market in general and reporting in specific. Table 2 
compares some key numbers of the Saudi stock market between 1996-2005. 
For example, in 2006 SACMA issued a draft for reporting requirements of corporate governance for listed 
companies. The draft provides recommendations of the criteria for the best corporate governance practice that 
should listed companies counsel. It has covered to some extent the main five principles issued by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, the responsibility of 
the board of directors. 
 
                                                        
3 Alqur’an Alkareem is the Holly book of Islam and Sunna Alsharifah is the interpretations, speeches and actions of Prophet 
Mohamed Peace be up on him. Alqur’an Alkareem and Sunna Alsharifah provide the main of Islamic instructions. 
4 Zaket is a financial religious duty and represents the third pillar. Alqur’an Alkareem & Sunna Alsharifah explain to Muslim the 
compliance with the Zaket duty. 
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Table 2  Key figures of Saudi stock market between 1996-2005 
Index Market value ($ million ) Traded stock (million) No. of transactions (thousand) Year 
1,531 46 138 284 1996 
1,958 59 314 460 1997 
1,413 43 295 377 1998 
2,029 61 528 438 1999 
2,258 68 555 498 2000 
2,430 73 692 605 2001 
2,518 75 1,736 1,034 2002 
4,438 157 5,566 3,763 2003 
8,206 306 10,298 13,320 2004 
16,713 650 12,281 46,607 2005 
Source: TADAWUL website accessed on 29th September 2006 
 
According to the recommendations of SACMA, listed companies are required to report to SACMA about 
their compliance with the criteria of corporate governance as issued by SACMA or reasons for incompliance if 
any. The disclosure contains, for example, the board of directors’ functions, responsibilities, formation, 
committees of board of directors; audit committee; Nomination and Remuneration Committee; Meetings of the 
Board and Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members5. 
Finally, SACMA asserted that the criteria for the best corporate governance practice mostly constitutes the 
guiding principles for all listed companies unless any other regulations, laws or rules require such requirement. 
4. Research hypotheses 
To examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on financing decisions in Saudi Arabian listed 
companies, we formulated three research hypotheses: the effect of board size, ownership concentration and 
corporate governance reporting on the debt-to-equity ratio as following. 
(1) Board size hypothesis 
Given that prior research investigating the association between board size and debt-to-equity ratios gave 
mixed result (see Section 2), we also revisited this research area and examined the association between board size 
and capital structure for Saudi Arabian companies. We set the following first research hypothesis for the impact of 
board size on capital structure: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a relationship between board size and debt-to-equity ratio. 
(2) Ownership concentration hypothesis 
Given the results of the prior research are–to some extent-mixed, we also revisited this research area and 
examined the association between ownership concentration and capital structure for Saudi Arabian companies. We 
set the following second research hypothesis for the impact of ownership concentration on capital structure: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a relationship between ownership concentration and debt-to-equity ratio. 
(3) Corporate governance reporting 
To examine the role of the information environment on capital structure decision in Saudi Arabian companies, 
                                                        
5 Detailed information about these regulations is discussed in the following articles (SACMA, 2006): Article 9: Disclosure in the 
Board of Directors’ Report; Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors; Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board; Article 12: 
Formation of the Board; Article 13: Committees of the Board; Article 14: Audit Committee; Article 15: Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; Article 16: Meetings of the Board; Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members. 
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we used a corporate governance voluntary disclosure index as a measure of a firm’s information environment and 
set the following third research hypothesis for the impact of corporate governance reporting on capital structure: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a relationship between corporate governance reporting and debt-to-equity ratio. 
5. Model development 
In order to test the above hypotheses, we regress debt-to-equity ratio on some corporate governance 
characteristics and some control variables. The study will investigate the following model: 
itLev = α  + β ′ itX + itε  
where: itLev  is defined as long term debt to equity ratio; α is the intercept. β ′ is the slope coefficient 
estimates of regressors. itX is the corporate governance variables (and control variables) for firm i at time t. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable ( itLev ) is defined as the long term debt to equity ratio. 
5.2 Independent variables 
We have three independent variables and two control variables. We identified three types of corporate 
governance variables: 
(1) Board size (BOARD): This represents the number of executive and non executive directors on the board. 
(2) Ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP): This represents the total percentage of the company’s shares 
that owned by owners. 
(3) Corporate governance reporting (DISCLOSURE): This is calculated as the number of sentences that 
include at least one corporate governance related information. 
5.3 Control variables 
(1) Profitability (PROF): We used return on total assets as a measure for firms’ profitability. 
(2) Growth opportunity (MB): We used share price to book value ratio as a measure for firm’s growth opportunity. 
6. Data 
Our data collection is based on a recent paper by Hussainey & AlNodel (2008). This helped us to focus on a 
group of firms that report corporate governance information on their websites. We focused on firms that disclose 
information through internet because prior research argued that internet reporting is one of the most important 
sources of voluntary disclosure and this source is more likely to complement published annual reports (Aly, 
Simon & Hussainey, 2010). Hussainey & AlNodel (2008) collected their sample from Saudi listed companies’ 
websites between October 2005 and January 2006. At that time, the total number of companies listed in the Saudi 
Stock Market was 77 representing eight sectors: agriculture, services, cement, industrial, banks, electrical, 
telecommunication and insurance. They used TADAWUL website (www.tdwl.net) and Google website 
(www.google.com) to access every company’s website. They deleted some companies from their analysis for a 
number of reasons. These include 11 firms without websites; one firm with a website under construction and one 
firm with a restricted website. This reduced their sample to 64 companies. We also further excluded 27 firms 
because of missing corporate governance and accounting information. This led to a sample of 37 listed firms for 
the current study. 
Data on debt-to-equity ratio, board size, ownership concentration, profitability and price-to-book value ratio 
were collected from TADAWUL website. Following Hussainey & AlNodel (2008), we used the content analysis 
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approach to measure the number of sentences that contain corporate governance information. Accordingly, we 
used the corporate governance disclosure index developed by Hussainey & AlNodel (2008) to analyze the content 
of every company’s website. 
7. Empirical results 
This section discusses the descriptive analysis, the correlation analysis and the empirical results. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive analysis (mean, minimum, maximum and the standard deviation). It shows that 
on average the number of directors on board in Saudi Arabia companies is around 8, with a minimum of 4 
members and a maximum of 11 members. Mean ownership concentration is 35.6 and the mean corporate 
governance disclosure is 5 sentences with a minimum of zero corporate governance sentence and a maximum of 
21 corporate governance sentences. 
A broad range of variation in financial variables is also evident in our sample. The debt-to-equity ratio ranges 
from 0 to 97 with a mean of 24.52 and a standard deviation of 32.576. The return on total assets ratio ranges from 
-37.3 to 71.74 with a mean of 8.8535 and a standard deviation of 13.81767. The share price to book value ratio 
ranges from 0 to 21 with a mean of 5.03 and a standard deviation of 5.336. On average, our sample covers large 
firms as the mean firm size is 23240077.81. Finally, our sample covers nine sectors as follows: Banks (9 firms), 
Chemical (8 firms); Cement (6 firms); Retailers (2); Energy (I firm); Agriculture (7 firms); Telecommunication (2 
firms); Advertising (1 firm) and Insurance (1 firm). 
 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics & industry classification 
(a) Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LEV 37 0 97 24.52 32.576 
BOARD 37 4 11 7.89 1.822 
OWNERSHIP 36 0.0 82.7 35.550 27.7875 
PROF 37 -37.30 41.74 8.8535 13.81767 
MB 37 0.00 66.87 9.9181 10.56721 
Total assets 37 0 136,950,480 23,240,077.81 3.888E7 
DISCLOSURE 37 0 21 5.03 5.336 
 
(b) Industry classification 











Table 4 shows the correlation analysis. The correlation between each of the independent variables is not too high. 
The highest correlation found between corporate governance disclosure and share price to book value ratio (MB) is 
43.5, which is acceptable. This confirms that no multicollinearity problem exists between the independent variables. 
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Table 4  Correlation analysis 
  DISCLOSURE BOARD OWNERSHIP LEV MB PROF 
DISCLOSURE Pearson Correlation 1.000 0.077 0.246 0.301 0.435** -0.139 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0.649 0.149 0.070 0.007 0.410 
 N 37 37 36 37 37 37 
BOARD Pearson Correlation 0.077 1.000 0.234 0.395* 0.083 0.212 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.649  0.170 0.016 0.626 0.207 
 
N 37 37 36 37 37 37 
OWNERSHIP Pearson Correlation 0.246 0.234 1.000 0.504** 0.097 0.064 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.149 0.170  0.002 0.574 0.711 
 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
LEV Pearson Correlation 0.301 0.395* 0.504** 1.000 0.109 -0.062 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.070 0.016 0.002  0.520 0.716 
 
N 37 37 36 37 37 37 
MB Pearson Correlation 0.435** 0.083 0.097 0.109 1.000 -0.019 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 0.626 0.574 0.520  0.910 
 
N 37 37 36 37 37 37 
PROF Pearson Correlation -0.139 0.212 0.064 -0.062 -0.019 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.410 0.207 0.711 0.716 0.910  
 
N 37 37 36 37 37 37 
Note: **: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 5 shows our empirical results. It shows that the coefficient estimate on board size is positive significant 
with a p-value of 0.059 (see model 4). This is consistent with Jensen (1986) who also found a positive association 
between higher debt ratios and larger board size. Our finding indicates that larger board size puts Saudi Arabian 
firms in a good position to finance their activities by using debt. This is consistent with the fact that higher quality 
of corporate governance improves companies’ financial performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) and hence leads 
increase the ability of the company to obtain debt. Ling & Zheng (2005) provided an explanation for this positive 
sign. They argued that boards with a large board size are more likely to have a difficulty in getting an agreement 
because of different and conflict opinions and views. Accordingly, firms with large number of directors on board 
might not choose equity financing which requires high transaction cost to resolve communication and 
coordination dilemma. In addition, they argued that directors would choose debt for financing their activities 
because this source of finance will not dilute the equity of current shareholders and change their current position. 
This leads us to accept hypothesis 1. 
Table 5 also shows that the coefficient estimate on ownership concentration is positive significant with a 
p-value of 0.005 (see model 4). This result is consistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999), Al-Najjar & Hussainey 
(2010a). This indicates that when the total percentage of the company’s shares is concentrated internally, 
managers will prefer to use debt to finance their companies’ activities. This is because, as mentioned in Ling & 
Zheng (2005), debt will not dilute the equity of current shareholders and change their current position. This leads 
us to accept hypothesis 2. 
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Table 5  Regression analysis 
(a) Model summary 
Model R R square Adjusted R square Std. error of the estimate 
1 0.617a 0.380 0.277 28.002 
2 0.616b 0.379 0.299 27.565 
3 0.602c 0.363 0.303 27.492 
4 0.576d 0.332 0.291 27.726 
Note: a. Predictors: (Constant), PROF, MB, OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; b. Predictors: (Constant), PROF, 
OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; c. Predictors: (Constant), OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; d. Predictors: (Constant), 
OWNERSHIP, BOARD. 
 
(b) ANOVAe analysis 
Model Sum of squares df. Mean square F Sig. 
Regression 14,436.181 5 2887.236 3.682 0.010a 
Residual 23,524.187 30 784.140   1 
Total 37,960.368 35    
Regression 14,405.109 4 3601.277 4.739 0.004b 
Residual 23,555.258 31 759.847   2 
Total 37,960.368 35    
Regression 13,774.798 3 4591.599 6.075 0.002c 
Residual 24,185.570 32 755.799   3 
Total 37,960.368 35    
Regression 12,592.380 2 6296.190 8.190 0.001d 
Residual 25,367.988 33 768.727   4 
Total 37,960.368 35    
Note: a. Predictors: (Constant), PROF, MB, OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; b. Predictors: (Constant), PROF, 
OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; c. Predictors: (Constant), OWNERSHIP, BOARD, DISCLOSURE; d. Predictors: (Constant), 
OWNERSHIP, BOARD; e. Dependent variable: LEV. 
 
(c) Coefficienta estimates 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficientsModel 
B Std. error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -39.090 21.252  -1.839 0.076 
BOARD 5.721 2.752 0.315 2.079 0.046 
OWNERSHIP 0.474 0.181 0.400 2.619 0.014 
DISCLOSURE 1.064 1.032 0.174 1.031 0.311 
MB -0.101 0.507 -0.032 -0.199 0.844 
1 
PROF -0.311 0.352 -0.132 -0.886 0.383 
(Constant) -39.272 20.901  -1.879 0.070 
BOARD 5.669 2.696 0.312 2.102 0.044 
OWNERSHIP 0.475 0.178 0.401 2.672 0.012 
DISCLOSURE 0.971 0.906 0.159 1.072 0.292 
2 
PROF -0.315 0.346 -0.134 -0.911 0.369 
(Constant) -38.586 20.831  -1.852 0.073 
BOARD 5.185 2.637 0.285 1.967 0.058 
OWNERSHIP 0.466 0.177 0.393 2.630 0.013 3 
DISCLOSURE 1.113 0.890 0.182 1.251 0.220 
(Constant) -35.046 20.814  -1.684 0.102 
BOARD 5.196 2.659 0.286 1.954 0.059 4 
OWNERSHIP 0.519 0.173 0.438 2.990 0.005 
Note: a. Dependent variable: LEV. 
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Finally, corporate governance disclosure as a proxy for asymmetric information between managers and 
investors is expected to be negative and statistically significant. However, Table 5 shows that the coefficient 
estimate of DISCLOSURE variable is positive, indicating that firms with higher levels of corporate governance 
disclosure (less information asymmetry) has higher debt-to-equity ratio. This finding is statistically insignificant 
and not consistent with prior research. This leads us to reject hypothesis 3. 
8. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure for 
Saudi Arabian listed companies. Our results show that the corporate capital structure decisions in Saudi Arabia is 
driven by some of the same corporate governance determinates suggested in prior research. Based on a sample of 
37 Saudi Arabian listed companies, our results show that the number of directors on boards and ownership 
concentration are the main drivers of Saudi companies for capital structure decisions. 
Our results, however, show that corporate governance reporting was not an important driver of Saudi 
companies for capital structure decisions. This might be due in part to the nature of the Saudi business 
environment where there is a weak reporting requirement of the practice of corporate governance in the country. 
This fact could have encourage parties to loan agreements approach different means to get the needed information 
rather than the traditional reporting mechanisms which is likely to be practical in a small community of businesses. 
This is also likely to be affected by the characteristics of Saudi society whereas the impact of the personality and 
power of particular individuals, the role of family and friend relationships prevail over regulations, and tasks, and 
the existence of a high level of secrecy. 
The main limitation of the study is that it did not cover the whole market, so the sample may not be 
representative of the population of Saudi companies. This, however, is justified by the nature of the study, which 
relied on the availability of data needed. Further recheck was carried for companies which are not included. We 
found that these companies are in general small and less likely to affect the results. Nevertheless, a study with a 
large number of companies is needed for future research. A future research may also try to overcome the limitation 
of the availability of data and investigate other determinants of capital structure decisions by utilizing other mean 
of research tools such interviews with parties involved in loan agreements. 
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